Reward arrangements for executive Directors and other senior executives need to remain in line with prevailing practices among other UK-parented companies and be competitive for a global consumer goods company. In 2006, the Committee reviewed arrangements and incentives to ensure that they remain effective and appropriate to the Company's circumstances and prospects and to monitor the level of potential awards. In the light of the introduction of IFRS and the evolving views of investors opposed to the re-testing of performance conditions applicable to share options, the Committee made the following changes to the policy with effect from 2 January 2006:
- No more discretionary share options will be granted unless general market conditions change or if there are particular circumstances that arise where an option grant would be appropriate;
- As a consequence, for executive Directors, the target and maximum levels of award under the AIP (defined opposite) increased from 80% and 120% to 100% and 150% of salary respectively, and the annual LTIP (defined opposite) award increased from 120% to 160% of salary. The percentage of the LTIP award which vests for threshold performance will reduce from 40% to 30% and this will reduce the percentage of shares vesting for all levels of performance below the 80th percentile. LTIP awards can now be made up to a maximum value of 200% of salary, but any award significantly higher than the proposed 160% level will only be made in exceptional circumstances;
- The BSRP (defined opposite) performance related scale was changed from step vesting to a straight line sliding scale;
- Also, in setting performance ranges for cycles for all our long-term plans from 2006 onwards, the economic profit and earnings per share ranges are expressed in absolute rather than real (post inflation) terms. This is partly because there is no one satisfactory inflation index against which to measure our performance (given that our earnings are generated in numerous currencies), and secondly because an absolute measure is simpler and in line with the way in which we communicate our results.
Similar changes were made to AIP, BSRP and LTIP for executives below Board level. For those who are not eligible for LTIP awards, we widened the scope of the International Share Award Plan. This gives conditional share awards if performance targets are met, so that the expected value of remuneration for these employees is maintained at broadly the same level as previously.
The chart below shows the fixed and variable elements of an executive Director's remuneration for 2007, and a range of outcomes for each component. Expected value is the present value of the sum of all the various possible outcomes at vesting or exercise of awards, and was calculated using industry accepted methodologies.

In line with recognised good practice and previous commitments, the Committee will undertake a fundamental review of remuneration policy and all incentive plans for submission to shareowners for approval at the AGM in 2008. The review will focus on the following key areas:
- The structure of senior executive remuneration packages and the balance between fixed and variable remuneration, short and long term incentives and local against international based remuneration;
- An assessment of the current incentive plans, individually and in the context of overall remuneration, including appropriate performance measures and the balance between Group, regional and local unit results and individual contributions;
- The issue of an appropriate comparator group for the purpose of remuneration comparisons; and
- The levels of shareownership required from executives in the context of the market.
Details about the conclusions reached in this review will be included in next year's remuneration report.
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